29 Mayıs 2011 Pazar

The Role of Affections in Decision Making

“many forms of decision making, especially those that involve a high level of risk and uncertainty, involve biases and emotions that act at an implicit level[1].” Experiences and conditioning that has been acquired in critical conditions may contribute to the repetitive triggering of previous correct decisions due to the feelings felt in the body or affections at the same time.

Affections make us select the cognitive processses according to the situation that we are in[2]. “For example, when things go smoothly and we face no hurdles in the pursuit of our goals, we are likely to rely on our pre-existing knowledge structures and routines, which have served us well in the past. Once things go wrong, however, we abandon this reliance on our usual routines and focus on the specifics at hand to determine what went wrong and what can be done about it. Hence, our actions, and the context in which we pursue them, are represented at a greater level of detail when things go wrong than when things go well (see Wegner & Vallacher, 1986).”

“Consistent with these conjectures, being in a negative affective state is associated with a narrowed focus of attention (e.g., Broadbent, 1971; Bruner, Matter, & Papanek, 1955; Easterbrook, 1959) and a higher level of spontaneous causal reasoning (e.g., Bohner, Bless, Schwarz, & Strack, 1988), paralleling the observation that failure to obtain a desired outcome shifts attention to a lower level of abstraction (e.g., Wegner & Vallacher, 1986)[2].”

“Intention is a form of volition. Intention depends on the condition based on time, place, event or other. Intention mechanism can be vitally important to exit or in being unable to exit pre-reflective consciousness in the cases of emrgency or contemplation[3].”

“the attentional blink has been shown to be modulated by emotional stimuli, as subjects are significantly better at detecting T2 when it is an emotion-laden word (e.g., rape) than when it is a neutral word (Anderson, 2005).[4]”

“Emotional content can change the formation and recollection of a memory event, consistent with findings in both human and animal studies. Compared to neutral items, humans remember better emotionally arousing information, including emotionally charged stories, film clips, pictures, and words[4].”

“The French mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal once wrote, ‘The heart has its reasons which reason knows not of.’ This message – that emotion and cognition are separate systems that seldom interact – has a long history in Western philosophy and science. However, the past two decades have seen a remarkable shift in this view as behavioral and neuroscience data have demonstrated that emotion and cognition not only interact, but that their integrative operation is necessary for adaptive functioning[5].”

With my wishes of good will.

[1] Nasir Naqvi, Baba Shiv, and Antoine Bechara, 2006 Association for Psychological Science , Current Directions in Psychologial Science, “The Role of Emotion in Decision Making, A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective”, Division of Cognitive Neuroscience, Department of Neurology, University of Iowa College of Medicine; Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; and Brain and Creativity Institute, and Department of Psychology, University of SouthernCalifornia
[2] Norbert Schwarz, Situated Cognition and the Wisdom of Feelings: Cognitive Tuning, University of Michigan Manuscript of a chapter in L. Feldman Barrett & P. Salovey (eds.), The wisdom in feeling (pp. 144-166). New York, Guilford Press, 2002
[3] Ali R+ SARAL, The Function of Volition in Providing Consciousness , http://largesystems-atc-en.blogspot.com/2011/04/function-of-volition-in-providing.html
[4] Luiz Pessoa, “Cognition and Emotion”, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN,http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Cognition_and_emotion
[5] Kevin N. Ochsner1 and Elizabeth Phelps, “Emerging perspectives on emotion–cognition interactions”, Department of Psychology, Columbia University, 1190 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, NY 10027, USA, Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003, USA